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Second Life in the Bundestag? Former GDR 
Delegates in German Parliaments 
Ronald Gebauer & Stefan Jahr  
Abstract: »Ein zweites Leben im Bundestag? Ehemalige DDR-Delegierte als 
bundesdeutsche Parlamentsabgeordnete«. East Germany’s 20th anniversary of 
a fully democratic representation in 2010 gives reason to reflect the democrati-
zation process again. Democratization was without doubt never contested by 
politicians with their political roots in the opposition groups. Nevertheless, in 
the early 1990s and even later on, there was still a considerable minority 
among East German MNPs and MSPs with a comparatively strong affiliation 
to the former communist system (though not necessarily member of one of 
SED’s successor parties). The German Parliamentary Survey (first wave, 2003) 
contains data of 140 of those ‘survivors’ out of 635 MNPs, MSPs and MEPs 
with an East German background. This contribution, first, reconsiders political 
representation in the GDR. Second, the social profile of delegates in the Bun-
destag and the State parliaments with their political roots in the SED and the 
bloc parties will be compared with that of those electees who appeared in the 
political arena in 1989/90 and later. Third, the adherence of former GDR dele-
gates to democratic values will be discussed, likewise mirrored in the German 
Parliamentary Survey, by asking delegates how they rate statements like: 
“Democracy persists only in the case of a strong leadership that is able to cur-
tail partial interests.” and other. 
Keywords: post-communist transition, East Germany, representative elites, 
delegates, politics. 
1. Introduction 
The 20th anniversary of a fully democratic representation in East Germany in 
2010 gave reason to reflect the democratization process in Germany again. 
Democratization is a process that is ridden with prerequisites and is a game of 
confidence and acceptance. In this question one may think on the relevance of 
the general populace and the electorate’s acceptance and confidence in demo-
cratic values. Nevertheless, this might not always be the only requirement to 
sustain enduring democratic processes. So if it is not, what are other, presuma-
bly more relevant conditions for a sustainable democratization? In order to 
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answer this question it is useful to take a closer look at the role of political 
elites. A very simple assumption about the role of political elites is that they are 
at least not indifferent towards such fundamental changes. Right on the con-
trary, as history tells us, the former ruling elites of the soviet type of societies 
usually heavily rejected the introduction of civil rights and a parliamentary 
democracy. In this case of tightly united elites democratization is rather im-
probable, if not impossible. The same is true in the case of utterly disunited 
political elites, as there is ample evidence by countries in the Middle East or 
the Balkans. Any of these constellations are highly detrimental for a genuine 
democratic development. John Higley suggests, however, that there is a specif-
ic elite composition, which is conducive to democratization. For this specific 
constellation it is remarkable that elite members, i.e. persons or groups form 
complex formal and informal networks, where they exert same activities and 
share similar skills. Additionally, and not less important, members of these 
networks share a consensus about the rules of political behavior, particularly 
with regard to the acquisition, execution and transmission of political power. In 
this respect, it is a consensually united elite (cf. Higley 2009).  
Historical Background I: Volkskammer and  
Delegates in the GDR 
The Peoples’ Chamber (Volkskammer) constituted on October 07, 1949 as a 
(socialist) national representative body ‘of a new type’ as opposed to a democ-
ratic parliament with changing majorities. Along the lines of Walter Ulbricht’s 
infamous “Everything has to look democratic but everything has to be con-
trolled by us.” members of the approved bloc parties also were allowed to 
nominate candidates on a single list, controlled by the ruling Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), in detail, 
members of the (East-German) Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Liberal 
Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD), National Democratic Party of Germany 
(NDPD), Democratic Farmer’s Party of Germany (DBD) and diverse mass 
organizations. In this respect, until the 9th election period the Volkskammer 
maintained a fixed ratio of mandates. The self concept of Volkskammer was to 
be the one and only institution of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
with the ultimate power as a constitutive and legislative representative body. 
This function implied also the election of Volkskammer’s presidium, the elec-
tion of members and of the chairman of the Council of Ministers (government), 
the election of the chairman of the National Council of Defence and of further 
important positions. In practice, however, Volkskammer’s relevance was that of 
a pure ratifying one, thereby legitimating decisions already taken by SED’s 
power elite. In addition to the Volkskammer, until 1958 the Chambers of States 
(Länderkammern) formally had legislative power, but had been continuously 
marginalized after 1952 when the division in districts was imposed by the SED, 
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paralleled now with genuine District Assemblies (Bezirkstag), furthermore 
supplemented by assemblies at the level of circle districts and the municipal 
level. 
Historical Background II:  
The Free Elected 10th Volkskammer 
After the collapse of the communist system in 1989 and a short interplay of the 
“round tables” the first and only free Volkskammer election on March 18, 1990 
swept the old order completely away. Only 12 former Volkskammer delegates 
could regain their mandates under the new condition on the national level and a 
few 6 candidates had been successful in the elections on the federal level on 
October 14, 1990. Nevertheless, particularly party members on the lower ranks 
and even apparatchics of the bloc parties (incorporated later on by their West-
ern pendants, except the SED or PDS: East-CDU, DBD, now part of the CDU; 
LDPD, NDPD, now part of the FDP) could move up and gained a sizeable 
share of seats. 
Table 1: Representatives of the 10th Volkskammer by Year of Joining the Party 
in % of Specified Data 
 CDU DBD FDP NDPD PDS DFD other all 
Until 1989 92 100 58 100 86 1 - 59 
1989/90 8 - 42 - 14 - 100 41 
Not specified  
(% of N) 
11 - 14 - 24 - 17 15 
N 165 9 22 2 67 1 143 409 
Source: Volkskammer data, author’s calculation, similar, cf. Hausmann, p. XVIII. 
 
As table 1 documents, also the majority of the now free elected Volkskammer 
members had been affiliated with the ancien régime, at least by party member-
ship (59%), (missing data not taken into account) in the case of the CDU 
amounting to a breathtaking 92% of all seats, even surpassing the PDS (86%) 
while the minority, not even half of all electees, had been no party members of 
one of the former bloc parties or the SED at all. Other information not at hand, 
involvement with former SED rule supposedly was even stronger, as for exam-
ple, data do not inform about Stasi activities, i.e. (informal) memberships of the 
infamous State Security Service of the GDR. By taking an ex-post perspective 
this casts a serious shadow on the political process in the early 1990s and as a 
matter of fact such an elite composition was at least for the first glance no safe 
bet for German Reunification1, keeping in mind, that fragmented, disunited 
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elites tend to harass or suppress each other. However, one can assume that 
there were some factors that alleviated the complex situation. First, party af-
filiation and especially sympathy with the old SED rule was supposedly rather 
weak at the new elected, but former secondary and tertiary political elites; 
reconsidering, that the old Volkskammer elite was almost non-existent any-
more. Second, the pressure of the people for reunification left Volkskammer 
members with no alternative. Third, as Heinrich Best proposed, also disunited 
elites can cooperate. Adopting the theoretical concept of antagonistic coopera-
tion, it becomes clear, that German Reunification turned out to be a win-win 
situation: On the one hand, resource transfers from the West and the removal of 
Soviet troops had been attractive for many Members of Volkskammer, the same 
applies even to the expansion of West German institutions, providing a stable 
framework for elite action or at least extended space of individual autonomy 
(cf. Best 2009). In this respect, discontent with the process of reunification 
(loss of power and relevance) had no negative consequences on reunification 
itself. On the other hand, West German political elite could likewise profit from 
reunification by extending its activity sphere nationally and also internationally 
by regaining full sovereignty on the whole of Germany (cf. Best/Vogel 2011). 
The Unification Treaty finally passed Volkskammer by 294 votes in favor, 62 
against on August 23, 1990. 
Table 2: Unification Treaty, Voting Results by Faction  
(Selection, % of Specified Data) 
 CDU SPD PDS FDP/LD DSU DBD DA NF GP/UFV 
Yes 100 95.2 0 100 100 100 100 14.3 0 
No 0 2.4 100 0 0 0 0 57.1 50 
abstention 0 2.4  0 0 0 0 28.6 50 
N 154 83 51 20 25 8 4 7 4 
Source: Volkskammer data, author’s calculation. 
 
After reunification, 149 members of the 10th Volkskammer ran for the 12th 
Bundestag, whereas 74 (=18% of all 409 Volkskammer members) were suc-
cessful in the election and obtained a seat as representative and so, at that time, 
56% of all East German MPs formerly were members of the 10th Volkskam-
mer. For this reason, Volkskammer ranks among the most relevant experiences 
of East German representatives that even today still share four MEPs and ten 
MNPs. The same applies for MSPs: in this case 88 members obtained a seat in 
one of the re-established state parliaments amounting to the ratio, that one in 
ten MSPs had a Volkskammer experience around the turn of the millenium. 
Currently, 12 MSPs had been members of the 10th free elected Volkskammer. 
                                                                                                                                
eyes and my pride clouded. About 185 of the new delegates were members of the SED or of 
one of the bloc parties during the just ceased old system.” (cf. Gauck 2009, 235). 
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Yet, how is the process of democratization to be evaluated retrospectively 
with regard to delegates’ composition around the turn of the millennium, when 
there was still a considerable parliamentary minority with political elite expe-
rience even before 1989 and also still some of those dissidents or civil rights 
activists left, who entered the political arena in 1989/1990? Has there emerged 
a consensually united elite, in respect to structural and normative principles, 
indispensable for the democratic process? 
Structural Integration 
Education 
Although the share of East German MNPs and MSPs is declining due to West-
East migration, East German population is still represented in Bundestag and 
State parliaments by delegates with a genuine East German socialization and 
this by a relevant share of seats. Here East German delegates with high levels 
of education are prevailing, 74% holding A-Levels and 77% graduated from 
universities or academies of applied sciences, compared to 71% of delegates of 
West German origin (cf. Best and Vogel).  
Additionally, if one differentiate between delegates with mandates, political 
or administrative functions even before 1989 and those around and after the 
system collapse 1990, the general impression of East German delegates gradu-
ally changes with 76% compared to 92% holding university or advanced tech-
nical degrees in the case of the latter. So, if lesser educated persons are not 
formally excluded from nomination, this elite composition will pose no prob-
lem with regard to the electorate. At the same time this composition may have 
been propitious for the emergence and sustainability of a consensually united 
elite, because delegates with high levels of education are supposed to be more 
result-oriented and therefore more prone for compromise. 
Table 3: School Leaving Degrees of East German Delegates % of N  
(MSPs, MPs, MEPs) 
 Pre-1989 1990 Later 
No school certificate 0    2.5 0 
8th Gr. Completed    6.8    3.7 1.4 
10th Gr. Completed 23.5 12.3 24.7 
A-Level (“Abitur”) 69.7 81.5 73.9 
N       132        81      421 
Source: Jenaer Abgeordnetenstudie 2003, author’s calculation 
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Table 4: Vocational/Professional Education of East German Delegates % of N 
(MSPs, MPs, MEPs) 
 Pre-1989 1990 Later 
unskilled 0 0 0.2 
skilled 7.5 4.9 10.3 
Master 3.7 0 1.8 
Polytechnical 12.7 3.7 10.1 
Advanced Technical 14.9 
61.2 }76% 
12.2 
79.3 }92% 
9.6 
University 65.6 
current training 0 0 2.3 
N 134 81 421 
Source: Jenaer Abgeordnetenstudie 2003, author’s calculation. 
Occupation 
Analysis of educational attainment documented the relevance of the high edu-
cational status of German representative bodies. Yet, how are German parlia-
ments composed by occupational or professional backgrounds? Answering this 
question will help to evaluate the communicative climate among delegates: Are 
there professions more suited to establish a consensually united elite than oth-
ers? Are there any professions more prevalent than other, helping to get in 
touch with colleagues and lower communication barriers? In this respect, 
Heinrich Best and Lars Vogel found that civil servants dominated parliaments 
in East and West Germany during the 1990s, by the majority from more than 
one-third in the case of East German MSPs (37%) up to almost half of East 
German MNPs (47%), West German delegates ranging somewhere in between 
(MSPs 38%; MNPs 40%). Meanwhile political and affiliated professions have 
been catching up; a parallel trend among both, East and West German dele-
gates. With regard to professional aptitude among East German delegates one 
can extend the analysis even further to the occupational/professional careers 
before 1989. As it turns out, in this respect, delegates with and without Pre-
1989 political elite experience only vary gradually: 23% of delegates with 
political carriers already before 1989 have had also managerial responsibilities. 
Nearly the same applies to delegates with a first political mandate or function 
in 1990. Here even 27% report managerial responsibilities and, last but not 
least, 28% of representatives without any political career on or before GDR’s 
collapse report managerial experience. Beside managerial responsibilities many 
East German delegates have job experiences of working independently at diffi-
cult problems or independent activities with responsibility. The same applies to 
63% of political elites with political careers on or before GDR’s collapse. In 
this respect, the percentage is smaller for the novices (44%). However, among 
novices are more employers, self-employed, independent and academic profes-
sions (14%) compared with pre-1989 political elites (5%) and delegates with 
political careers starting in 1989/90 (8%). These findings – prevalence of aca-
demic education and vocational/professional careers mirroring managerial 
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responsibilities or independent activities with or without responsibility, keeping 
in mind, give the impression that there have been indeed favorable conditions 
for the establishment of a consensually united political elite in East Germany. 
In relation to the whole of Germany, the situation is similar, because, as for 
both, among West and East German delegates, the same professions prevail 
and the same trend, i.e. growing relevance of political and affiliated profes-
sions, is in progress. 
Table 5: Occupational/Professional Skills of East German Delegates % of N 
(MSPs, MPs, MEPs) 
 Pre-1989 1990 Later 
Managerial Responsibilities 23 27.3 28 
Diff. Problems/Independent activities 62.9 62.6 43.9 
Self employed/independent 5.4 7.6 14.3 
N 113 80 408 
Source: Jenaer Abgeordnetenstudie 2003, author’s calculation. 
Normative Integration 
So far, East Germany’s political elite has been portrayed as a structural con-
solidated formation, at least in terms of educational and occupational back-
grounds. Additionally, East Germany’s political elite varies only little from 
West Germany’s. However, one might ask if this favorable condition will result 
in a homogenous, normatively consolidated elite that shares the same attitudes 
in relation to the acquisition, execution, and transmission of political power. 
This question draws major attention to the attitudes of delegates, i.e. their 
evaluation of political institutions, parliamentary procedures, and their own 
colleagues. In the following, we focus, first, on two items related to politics, in 
detail delegates’ Esprit de Corps and party discipline, and second, on one item 
related to policy, namely delegates’ attitude towards state intervention.  
Politics I: Esprit de Corps 
1989/90 was a major caesura in almost every East German biography. This 
applies also for political elites. Novices and former secondary or tertiary elites 
collected their first experience in parliamentary democracy. One can assume, 
that these experiences have tied electees together, keeping in mind, that they 
had not only to adapt to a democratic process they have not known before, but 
they also had to take a vast number of decisions with far and profound implica-
tions. One might guess that this sort of learning-by-doing has left indelible 
memories in the minds of delegates across all factions. However, data analysis 
reveals, that even though there is a considerable esprit de corps, attitudes are 
more heterogeneous than expected. In general, esprit de corps varies dependent 
on the start of political commitment: As it turns out, particularly representatives 
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with political careers starting in 1989/90 were advocates of such strong atti-
tudes: More than 70% of them replied the question, if they feel associated with 
their colleagues from other parties and factions with ‘Yes’. Compliance is less 
common among representatives with pre-1989 experience: Only about half of 
them feel associated with their political opponents. Novices after 1989/90 again 
feel gradually more affiliated than the pre-1989 elite (60%), but consent is less 
present than among delegates with a first political mandate or function in 1990. 
Table 6: Esprit de Corps among East German Delegates  
(MSPs, MPs, MEPs, Compliance % of N) 
 Pre-1989 1990 Later 
Esprit de Corps 52.1 71.1 59.7 
N 73 45 303 
Source: Jenaer Abgeordnetenstudie 2003, author’s calculation. 
Politics II: Party Discipline 
Party discipline is one of the fundamental basics of parliamentary democracy, 
facilitating political action and parliamentary compromise. As a rule, in order 
to enable the exertion of influence, delegates vote in accordance with the pre-
ordained stance of the faction. In relation to conformity with their faction’s 
stance, delegate’s attitudes also vary, though similar to esprit de corps, a major-
ity accepts parliamentary party discipline. 
Table 7: Party Discipline Among East German Delegates 
(MSPs, MPs, MEPs, Compliance % of N)  
 Pre-1989 1990 Later 
Party Discipline 56.9 72.3 58.5 
N 72 47 299 
Source: Jenaer Abgeordnetenstudie 2003, author’s calculation. 
Policy: State Control of the Labor Market 
Delegates also were asked, whether they comply with political interventions in 
the labor market by state controlled creation and maintenance of jobs. As it 
emerges from the data, state control among delegates is mostly rejected. Addi-
tionally, variation across delegates is rather small. Both, pre-1989 political 
elites and novices after 1989/90 reject state intervention by 77%, delegates with 
a first political mandate or function in 1990 by 80%. 
  
 161 
Table 8: Attitude with Regard to State Intervention Among East German 
Delegates (MSPs, MPs, MEPs, Rejection% of N) 
 Pre-1989 1990 Later 
State Intervention 77 80 77.3 
N 74 45 304 
Source: Jenaer Abgeordnetenstudie 2003, author’s calculation. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
As Heinrich Best and Lars Vogel have already examined in more detail, West 
and East German political elites’ social profile and attitudes obviously are as 
sufficiently homogeneous, so that one can speak of a consensually united elite. 
The objective of this contribution, however, is to supplement our colleagues’ 
findings with the historical component, by asking, whether there have or had 
been a genuine ‘Second Life’ of former GDR Delegates in German Parliaments 
after the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ and German reunification. As analysis reveals, 
the initial position in 1990 even after the first free Volkskammer election, turns 
out to be ambivalent, since many delegates had been members of SED or bloc 
parties once before. New political elites, formerly not entangled with SED rule, 
however, with similar qualification, took responsibility. Their experience re-
sulted in attitudes that are up to now (though there are only some who are still 
delegates) marked by a higher and sustained appreciation of consensus and 
compromise. This gradual variation has or had been no disadvantage for the 
democratization process of the last two decades. On the contrary, it underlines 
the presence of a cooperating consensually united elite not only in East Ger-
many but also in the whole of Germany. 
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